

Message Text

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APPROVED BY INR/DDR:MPACKMAN

INR/PMT: R. BARAZ

EUR/RPM: D. KINNEY

EUR/SOV: D. HERSPRING

EUR/RPM: J. MARESCA

EUR/EE:N;ANDREWS

EUR/CE: G. HUMPHREY

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NOFORN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CSCE, PARM

SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON MANEUVERS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

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1. FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, FOLLOWING IS INR'S ANALYSIS OF SOVIET TREATMENT OF NATO MANEUVERS AND CBMS SINCE CSCE SUMMIT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: A DETAILED REVIEW OF WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID SINCE THE CSCE SUMMIT LEADS TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:

(A)--THE VEHEMENCE OF SOVIET MEDIA CRITICISM OF NATO EXERCISES HAS BEEN IN PART A REACTION TO NATO'S ADOPTION OF A NEW PRACTICE OF INTEGRATING ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE EXERCISES INTO A SINGLE PROGRAM (AUTUMN FORGE). THE VOLUME OF SUCH CRITICISM (DOUBLE LAST YEAR'S CRITICISM OF EXERCISES) APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RELATED TO THE FACT THAT THIS YEAR THERE HAS BEEN MORE WESTERN PUBLICITY ABOUT NATO EXERCISES THAN USUAL.

(B)--ALL TREATMENT OF NATO EXERCISES IN THE MEDIA HAS BEEN REPORTAGE OR SIGNED COMMENTARIES; THERE HAVE BEEN NO LEADERSHIP STATEMENTS.

(C)--ONLY TWO OF THE SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON NATO EXERCISES HAVE TOUCHED ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS). THEY DISMISSED WESTERN NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES AS IRRELEVANT TO THE LARGER QUESTION OF WHETHER SUCH EXERCISES COMPORTED WITH DETENTE. APPEARANCE OF THESE COMMENTARIES SHORTLY AFTER THE FIRST INVITATIONS TO OBSERVE A NATO EXERCISE WERE ISSUED SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PREFER NOT TO GET SUCH INVITATIONS AND WOULD LIKE TO MINIMIZE ANY EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS.

(D)--WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CHARGES IN THE WESTERN PRESS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CONDUCTED EXERCISES IN VIOLATION OF THE NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT.

(E)--IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL VIOLATE THE NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS. SINCE THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION IS 25,000 MEN, IT MAY BE SOME TIME--PERHAPS A YEAR OR MORE--BEFORE THE SOVIETS ENGAGE IN MANEUVERS OF THAT SECRET

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SIZE AND SOVIET COMPLIANCE IS ACTUALLY TESTED.

(F)--TO THE DEGREE THAT THE USSR ENGAGES IN PUBLIC POLEMICS OVER EXERCISES AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, THE SOVIET POSITION ON STABILIZING MEASURES IN MBFR IS LIKELY TO STIFFEN FURTHER. END SUMMARY

3. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CLEARLY HAVE PREFERRED NOT TO HAVE HAD CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS) ON THE CSCE AGENDA AT ALL AND BARGAINED HARD ON THE DETAILS IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE ITS OBLIGATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS (MORE THAN 25,000 MEN) AND EXCHANGES OF OBSERVERS AT EXERCISES AND ACCEPTED THE

RATIONALE THAT SUCH MEASURES COULD PREVENT MISPERCEPTIONS
AND THUS REDUCE TENSIONS.

4. ALTHOUGH SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF CBMS WAS GRUDGING,
INITIAL SOVIET TREATMENT OF THEM WAS QUITE FAVORABLE.
RECENT SOVIET PRESS ARTICLES, HOWEVER, HAVE QUESTIONED
THEIR UTILITY.

5.-BREZHNEV SETS TONE: IN HIS JULY 31 SPEECH NUMBER OF
BREZHNEV NOTED: "THE CONFERENCE HAS ADOPTED A NUMBER OF
IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS SUPPLEMENTING THE POLITICAL RELAX-
ATION BY A MILITARY ONE. THIS IS ALSO A QUALITATIVELY NEW
STAGE IN BUILDING UP CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES." THIS
FAVORABLE, IF SOMEWHAT OBLIQUE, REFERENCE TO CBMS WAS
AMPLIFIED BY TASS THE NEXT DAY. TASS DEVOTED NEARLY A

FULL PAGE TO A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE CSCE PRIOR-
NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS--OUT OF FIVE PAGES DESCRIBING THE
ENTIRE FINAL ACT. THIS EMPHASIS SEEMED TO INDICATE A
SOVIET DESIRE TO DEMONSTRATE FULL SUPPORT FOR THE TOTAL
CSCE PACKAGE.

6. CRITICISM OF NATO MANEUVERS, SUPPORT FOR CBMS:
THROUGH AUGUST AND INTO SEPTEMBER THE SOVIET MEDIA FOL-
LOWED TWO SEPARATE LINES. SOVIET COMMENTATORS CONTINUED
TO PRAISE CBMS, WHILE THEY DEVELOPED SHARPENING
CRITICISMS OF NATO EXERCISES.

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7. WHEN THE ANNUAL LARGE-SCALE NATO EXERCISE (HILEX-75)
PLANNED FOR LATER THIS YEAR WAS ANNOUNCED IN EARLY
AUGUST, THE SOVIETS WERE, NOT SURPRISINGLY, CRITICAL. AN
ARTICLE IN RED ST (AUGUST 8, 1975) CHARGED THAT THE
TIMING OF "...THIS PROVOCATIVE PROPAGANDISTIC MILITARY
SPECTACLE...MADE KNOWN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE...." WAS HARDLY
COINCIDENTAL. BUT IT MADE NO MENTION OF CBMS.

8. DURING A SOCIAL FUNCTION IN VIENNA ON AUGUST 15, THE
HUNGARIAN AND POLISH MILITARY ATTACHES APPROACHED THE US
MILITARY ATTACHE TO ASK WHY NATO WAS PLANNING TO HOLD A
MAJOR EUROPEAN MILITARY MANEUVER IN OCTOBER IN VIEW OF
THE RECENT CSCE AGREEMENTS IN HELSINKI. THEY WERE CRITICAL
THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN "INVITED" TO OBSERVE THE MANEUVERS.
THEY MAY HAVE BEEN ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF GOVERNMENTAL
DIRECTION IN INQUIRING ABOUT OBSERVER INVITATIONS, BUT
THEIR DOING SO CERTAINLY INDICATES THAT THEY HAD NO
GOVERNMENTAL DIRECTION TO DOWNPLAY CBMS.

9. A LENGTHY ARTICLE IN PRAVDA ON AUGUST 20 REFLECTED AN
INCREASINGLY CAUTIOUS AND DEFENSIVE TONE IN SOVIET
COMMENTARY ON CSCE AND DETENTE, RESPONDING TO WESTERN

EXPRESSIONS OF SKEPTICISM ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE AUTHOR DEVOTED THREE PARAGRAPHS TO PRAISE OF CBMS--AS IF THEY WERE A SOVIET INVENTION. A DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE USA INSTITUTE TOLD EMBASSY MOSCOW THE SAME DAY THAT THE ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN (UNDER THE PSEUDONYM DMITRIYEV) BY A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT.

10. WHEN, ON AUGUST 26, TASS REPORTED THE THEN-FORTHCOMING NATO EXERCISE, DEEP EXPRESS-75, IT CONFINED ITS DESCRIPTION TO A PURELY FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF ITS PARTICULARS. A FAR DIFFERENT MOOD, HOWEVER, APPEARED IN AN AUGUST 30 RED STAR ARTICLE ENTITLED "THE ATLANTICISTS ARE BECOMING MORE

ACTIVE." IT SHARPLY ATTACKED DEEP EXPRESS AND OTHER NATO EXERCISES PLANNED FOR THIS FALL AS AN "UNPRECEDENTED DEMONSTRATION OF THE NATO MILITARY MACHINE."

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11. ALTHOUGH NATO'S FALL MANEUVERS THIS YEAR ARE NOT ACTUALLY LARGER THAN NORMAL, THEY MAY HAVE GIVEN THE APPEARANCE OF BEING SO. THIS IS BECAUSE A NUMBER OF DIVERSE NATO AND NATIONAL EXERCISES HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO ONE, BROADER, COORDINATED SERIES--AUTUMN FORGE-75. THE OBJECTIVE OF AUTUMN FORGE--TO FURTHER ALLIED MILITARY COHESIVENESS--MADE IT A NATURAL SUBJECT FOR SOVIET CRITICISM. A RED STAR ARTICLE ON AUGUST 30 ASKED: "WHY WAS IT NECESSARY AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME TO SUDDENLY DEMONSTRATE THE NOTORIOUS 'ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY' AND TO INVOLVE NEARLY ALL THE (NATO) BLOC'S ARMED FORCES? NOW, AFTER THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IN HELSINKI OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, MILITARIST ACTIVENESS CANNOT HELP BUT EVOKE THE BEWILDERMENT OF THE PEOPLES OF THE CONTINENT."

DESPITE THE NEGATIVE TONE OF THE ENTIRE ARTICLE, AND THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN FORMALLY NOTIFIED A WEEK EARLIER OF GROSSE ROCHADE (MORE THAN 25,000 MEN) AND DEEP EXPRESS (LESS THAN 25,000 MEN), THE ARTICLE DID NOT MENTION CBMS.

12. MOREOVER, AS LATE AS SEPTEMBER 9, A THREE-MAN PANEL DISCUSSION ON MOSCOW DOMESTIC TELEVISION INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STILL TAKING A FAVORABLE LINE ON CBMS. THE PANEL INCLUDED TOLKUNOV, THE CHIEF EDITOR OF IZVESTIA, AND THE HEAD OF TASS. TOLKUNOV LED THE PANEL INTO A FAVORABLE DISCUSSION OF THE CBM CONCEPT; ACTUAL WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS WERE CITED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS EFFICACY.

13. CBMS DRAWN INTO THE ATTACKS ON NATO EXERCISES: SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, THEN, PRAVDA ON SEPTEMBER 15 CARRIED AN ARTICLE BY YURIY KHARLANOV THAT CONTAINED AN

ASSESSMENT OF CBMS THAT WAS THE OPPOSITE OF THE ONE THAT
APPEARED IN THAT PAPER ON AUGUST 20. LIKE THE SEPTEMBER 9 PANEL DISCUSSION, THE KHARLANOV ARTICLE ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT THE WEST HAD GIVEN PROPER ADVANCE NOTIFICATION--THE
FIRST SOVIET PRESS RECOGNITION OF THIS FACT--BUT IT
DISCOUNTED THIS ACTION AS IRRELEVANT TO THE LARGER ISSUE.
IT CHARGED THAT THE "PRESENT NATO CAMPAIGN" OF MANEUVERS
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IS CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF DETENTE. LIKE THE AUGUST 30 RED STAR ARTICLE, THE PRAVDA ARTICLE APPEARED PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH AUTUMN FORGE'S "SCALE" AND ITS ATTENDANT "PROPAGANDA BALLYHOO."

14. RED STAR TOOK UP THE ATTACK AGAIN ON SEPTEMBER 21, WITH AN ARTICLE BY ONE OF THE AUTHORS (COL. M. PONOMAREV, A REGULAR WRITER FOR RED STAR) OF THE AUGUST 30 DIATRIBE. THE NEW RED STAR ARTICLE CHARGED THAT THE NATO EXERCISES--COMING SOON AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT--REFLECT "...NERVOUSNESS ABOUT DETENTE ON THE PART OF THE NATO LEADERSHIP." BUT RED STAR DID NOT MENTION CBMS.

15. SIMILARLY, A TASS DISPATCH OF SEPTEMBER 20 ON NATO MANEUVERS IN WEST GERMANY CHARGED NATO'S MILITARY LEADERS WITH ACTING "...AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF RELAXATION IN EUROPE" BUT MADE NO MENTION OF CBMS.

16. THE VALUE OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES WAS BELITTLED A SECOND TIME, BY AN IZVESTIA POLITICAL COMMENTATOR, Y. GOLOSHUBOV, ON SEPTEMBER 22. USING WORDING VERY SIMILAR TO PRAVDA'S SEPTEMBER 15 ARTICLE, GOLOSHUBOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION HAD BEEN GIVEN, BUT HE ARGUED THAT THE MERE NOTIFICATION OF AN EXERCISE "...IGNORES A MAIN POINT--THIS IS, THE GENERAL SPIRIT OF THIS MOST IMPORTANT (CSCE) MEETING...AS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW STAGE IN THE PEACEFUL LIFE OF THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE."

17. WHY THE SOVIETS REACTED: THE PRIMARY TARGET OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN NATO'S NEW EXERCISE CONCEPT (AUTUMN FORGE) AND THE ATTENDANT WESTERN PUBLICITY. THE ATTACK ON CBMS WAS A SMALL PART OF THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF NATO EXERCISES.

18. BEYOND THAT, THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEEN REACTING TO THE DETAIL OF WESTERN NOTIFICATIONS. OF THE FIVE EXERCISES OF WHICH NATO STATES HAVE GIVEN ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, ONLY TWO WERE "MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS." SINCE THE WARSAW PACT RARELY HOLDS EXERCISES OF OVER 25,000 MEN IN THE 250-KILOMETER RANGE FROM EUROPE PRESCRIBED BY THE
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CSCE FINAL ACT, THE SOVIETS MAY WANT TO SHUN A PRECEDENT FOR REGULARLY ANNOUNCING SMALLER EXERCISES.

19. THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY ALSO WANT TO DISCOURAGE INVITATIONS TO EXERCISES AND THE PRECEDENT OF HAVING TO INVITE WESTERN OBSERVERS TO WARSAW PACT EXERCISES. THE CHRONOLOGY PROVIDES CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON THIS POINT:

(A)--THE FIRST INVITATION FOR OBSERVERS WAS THE ONE SENT OUT ON SEPTEMBER 12 BY THE FRG FOR THE CERTAIN TREK EXERCISE (OCTOBER 14-23).

(B)--SOVIET POLITICAL COMMENTATORS PLAYED UP CBMS AS ONE OF THE CSCE'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS LATE AS SEPTEMBER 9.

(C)--KHARLANOV AND GOLOSHUBOV HAD NEARLY IDENTICAL CRITISMS OF THE VALUE OF CBMS ON SEPTEMBER 20 AND 22. THEY MIGHT HAVE HAD A COMMON BRIEFING IN THE WEEK AFTER THE INVITATION WAS RECEIVED.

20. THE USSR HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE INVITATION TO ATTEND CERTAIN TREK, AND, ACCORDING TO ONE ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT, TRIED TO DISCOURAGE OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES FROM ACCEPTING. (NOTE: A ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT TOLD A DEPARTMENT OFFICER ON SEPTEMBER 19 THAT ONE OF THE SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD CALLED IN THE WARSAW PACT AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW RECENTLY TO URGE THAT THEY NEITHER ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE WEST'S NOTIFICATIONS NOR SEND OBSERVERS--BUT THAT THE ROMANIANS HAD INFORMED THE SOVIETS THAT THEY HAD ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGED THE NOTES. THE ROMANIAN DCM IN MOSCOW CONFIRMED THE FACT THAT ROMANIA HAD SENT NOTES ACKNOWLEDGING THE RECEIPT OF THE INVITATION--SOMETHING WHICH NO OTHER PACT COUNTRY DID--BUT HE DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY MEETING IN MOSCOW ON THE SUBJECT.) WHETHER THE SOVIETS DID OR NOT, NO WARSAW PACT MEMBER HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO A NATO EXERCISE OR ANNOUNCED ONE OF ITS OWN. YUGOSLAVIA IS THE ONLY COMMUNIST COUNTRY THAT HAS ACCEPTED THE INVITATION TO CERTAIN TREK AND ANNOUNCED AN EXERCISE OF ITS OWN.

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21. NOTIFICATION OF SOVIET EXERCISES: THERE HAVE BEEN ACCUSATIONS IN THE WESTERN PRESS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CARRIED OUT LARGE EXERCISES BUT FAILED TO GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF THEM. THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CARRIED OUT MANEUVERS WITH MORE THAN 25,000 MEN IN EASTERN EUROPE OR IN AN AREA WITHIN 250 KILOMETERS OF ITS EUROPEAN BORDERS. EXCEPT FOR ONE

UNCONFIRMED WEST GERMAN REPORT, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS OR OTHER PACT COUNTRIES HAVE DELIBERATELY SHAVED THEIR EXERCISES TO PUT THEM JUST BELOW THE 25,000 MARK.

22. IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL VIOLATE THE PROMISE TO GIVE NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES OF MORE THAN 25,000 MEN. SOVIET MANEUVERS INVOLVING THAT NUMBER OF MEN DO NOT OCCUR FREQUENTLY. AN EXERCISE IN WHICH THE COMBAT ELEMENTS OF TWO DIVISIONS OPPOSE EACH OTHER WOULD BE WELL BELOW THAT FIGURE. IT MAY BE SOME TIME--PERHAPS A YEAR OR EVEN MORE--BEFORE THERE IS A SOVIET OR PACT EXERCISE WHICH MEETS THE 25,000-MAN CRITERION AND PUTS EASTERN COMPLIANCE TO AN ACTUAL TEST.

23. STABILIZING MEASURES: TO THE DEGREE THAT MOSCOW CONTINUES ITS PRESS ATTACKS ON NATO EXERCISES AND CBMS ARE DRAWN INTO THE ARGUMENT, THE SOVIET POSITION ON STABILIZING MEASURES IN MBFR IS LIKELY TO BECOME EVEN STIFFER THAN IT IS ALREADY. WHILE THE CSCE SUCCEEDED IN SECURING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT THAT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN HELP THE PROCESS OF RELAXATION OF TENSION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET PUBLIC ARGUMENTS THAT CBMS ARE IRRELEVANT--OR POSITIVELY HARMFUL--WOULD MAKE THE USSR EVEN MORE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT NEW ARMS CONTROL MEASURES OF THIS TYPE. KISSINGER

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